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HE trading of options on agricultural commod-
ities has been banned in the United States since 1936.
In apreliminary step to lift this ban, Congressincluded
a provision in the Futures Trading Act of 1982 that
authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) to establish pilot programs in the trading
of agricultural options. Although actual trading of op-
tions on domestically produced agricultural commod-
itieshas notyet takenplace, the CFTC expectsits pilot
program to include one option contract at each ofthe
major exchanges.1 The pilot programs for agricultural
commodities are expected to begin sometime in late
1984 and continue for three years, at which time they
will be evaluated.
For many people, the role of options in an overall
risk-management strategy is unclear. In fact, because
options trading has been banned for many years, the
distinguishing characteristics ofoptions are not widely
known outside the commodities profession. This arti-
cle attempts to clarify some ofthese issues by explain-
ing the basic features of options and drawing distinc-
tions between options and futures. The discussion also
includes some simple examples of how options can
function as a risk-management tool. Finally, because
options contracts contain some — but not all — ofthe
features of agricultural price support programs, the
relationship between options markets and price sup-
ports is discussed.
‘Options on sugar are traded currently at the New York Coffee,
Sugarand CocoaExchange aspartofthepilotprogram’s firststage;
the options apply, however, only to sugar produced outside ofthe
United States, Options on gold, Treasury bond and stock index




To define the unique characteristics of acommodity
option, it might be useful first to discuss two related
concepts: forward contracts and futures contracts•2 A
forward contract typically takes the form of an agree-
ment between a commodity producer and an in-
termediary agent like the operator ofa grain elevator.
The contract typically defines an agreement in which a
producer agrees to deliver to an elevator owner a
specified quantity of grain at a stated date for a set
price; the elevator owner agrees to accept delivery of
the grain and to pay the set price.
A futures contract is a binding legal agreement be-
tween parties tosell orpurchase a specified quantity of
a standardizedcommodity at a stated date in thefuture
for a set price. For example, corn contracts at the
Chicago Board ofTradearewritten in 5,000 bushel lots
of No. 2 yellow corn and carry stated delivery dates of
2
General referenceson the roleofhedgingincludeHolbrook Work-
ing, “Hedging Reconsidered,” Journal of Farm Economics
(November 1953), PP. 544—Si; Ronald 1. McKinnon, “Futures
Markets, Buffer Stocks and Income Stability for Primary Produc-
ers,” Journal ofPolitical Economy (December 1967), pp. 844-MI;
and Anne E. Peck, “Hedging and Income Stability: Concepts,
Implications, and anExample,” AmericanJournal ofAgricultural
Economics (August 1975), pp. 410—19.
Ageneral overviewoftrading in commodity options can hefound
in Avner Wolf, “Fundamentals of Commodity Options on Fu-
tures,” Journal of Futures Markets (Winter 1982), pp. 391—408;
Bruce L. Gardner, “Commodity Options forAgriculture,” Amer-
ican Journal of Agricultural Economics (December 1977), pp.
986—92; and William J. Baumol, “Commodity Options: On Their
Contribution to The Economy,” mimeographed (Princeton, N.J.:
Mathematica, Inc., September 1973).
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up to 16 months forward.3 The set priceat which the
corn can be bought or sold is determined daily in the
market wherethis particular futurescontract istraded.
These definitions indicate at least two respects in
which forward and future contracts differ. First, fu-
tures are standardizedcontracts traded in highly liquid
and well-organized markets. In contrast, forwardcon-
tracts are individual agreements between two parties;
their unique, case-by-case nature effectively prevents
their trading and, consequently, makes them very il-
liquid. Thetwo contracts also differ intheir handling of
prices at which exchange will occur. Specifically, the
price at which grain will change hands in the forward
contract is fixed for the duration of the contract. The
price ofa futures contract, on the otherhand, changes
daily as new supply and demand information affects
agents’ expectations of market prices at the time the
futures contract expires. Because forward contracts are
not traded in organized markets, they are excluded
from the remainder of the discussion.4
The price of a corn futures contract depends on
expectations of future spot corn prices, and, because
these expectations change from day to day, so, too, do
contract prices. Ifa trader believes that cornprices will
be above the overall price expected by the market(the
average contract price) in the future, hewill buy acorn
contract for future delivery of 5,000 bushels; this is a
“long” position, whichwill generatean economicprofit
if the price of corn rises above the contract price.
Conversely, an agent who wants to insure against a
decline in the expected future price of corn will sell a
futures contract agreeing todelivercorn atsome future
date; this is a “short” position. If the agent is an agri-
cultural producer who holds an inventory ofcorn, this
strategy will provide a hedge against price declines.
We can see, then, why futures markets might exist.5
Producers (hedgers) who wish to avoid risk sell a fu-
tures contract; although they forfeit the chance to in-
3
Com contracts are dated for March, May, July, September and
December delivery. Contracts typically expire during the second
to last week of the stated delivery month.
rTh~
5
isnot to say that forward-contracting isunimportant. Instead,
unlike futures and options, forward contracts are individual legal
agreements not traded in organized markets.
rrme question ofwhy futures markets exist doesnot havea definitive
answer, Some economists have arguedthat these markets perform
an insurance function while others find value in the amount ol
information on prices andprice expectations that futures markets
produce; see, for example, Fischer Black, “The Pricing ofConi-
modity Contracts,” Journal of Financial Economics (January!
March 1976), pp. 167—79.
Some economists, however, have questioned the validity ofthe
insurance argument; see, for example, Lester C. Telser “Why
There Are Organized Futures Markets,”Journal ofLawand Eco-
crease profits ifprices increase, they are guaranteed a
known return. Other agents (speculators) bear this
pricerisk inreturn for the chance to profit ifprices rise
above expectations. As we will see, options function in
a similar manner, except forone distinguishingfeature
offutures contracts: the only way to escape the obliga-
tion ofthe futurescontract is to sell ittoanother party.
WHAT IS AN OPTION?
In contrast, an option conveys the right, but not the
obligation, to buy or sella given amount ofa commod-
ity at a fixed price until some specified date when the
option expires. Unlike a futures contract, which re-
quires the purchase orsale ofa commodity, theholder
ofan option mayelect to let the option expire without
exercising its rights. In this sense, an option is more
like a form ofpriceinsurance in which one person pays
a premium to insure against thepossibility ofaparticu-
lar event occurring. Ifthat event — specifically, alarge
change in price — does not occur, the person who
purchased the option loses only the premium he paid
for the priceinsurance. In comparison, losses on short
futures positions, essentially, are unlimited; losses on
long futures positions are limited to the price of the
contract.
The two basic types ofoptions are the “put” and the
“call.” A call option gives the purchaser ofthat option
the right to purchase a given quantity ofa commodity
at a stated price on or before the option’s expiration
date. Conversely, a put option gives the option pur-
chaser the rightto sell a givenquantity ofa cornmodity
at astated priceon orbefore theexpiration date; again,
with respect to the CFTC pilot program, options will
convey the right to buy or sell a particular futures
contract.°
nomics(April 1981), pp. 1—23. Inparticular, Telser contends that a
foward contract can provide all of the price insurance offered by a
futures contract. Instead, he argues, futures markets exist to meet
thedemand for a “fungible financial instrument traded in a liquid
market” (p. 8). Or, rather, even though forward contracts and
futures both provide price insurance, the illiquidity of forward
contractscreates a demand for a more liquid instrument that holds
the attributes ofmoney (or near money). Futures contracts exist,
Telser argues, to meet this demand forliquidity, not the demand
for price insurance.
Finally, some observers have argued that trading in futures is
little more than gambling.
~‘Fhemanagement andsurveillance ofthe pilotprogram have been
simplified by permitting options to apply only to trades offutures
contracts. Thatis, unlike an option to purchase a physicalproduct
— a trade that would require agreements on the quality of the
product, placeofdelivery and other contract features — the pilot
program will permitonlythetrading ofoptions on thestandardized
futures contracts of specific commodities.
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Table 1
Sample Listing of Options on Sugar Futures
COFFEE. SUGAR & COCOA EXCHANGE Sugar Option Prices 5 31 83 c lb
Strike Settlement Strike Settlement
Prices Calls Puts Prices Calls Puts
July83 650 690 001 Oct83 700 650 001
13.36 700 640 001 1350 750 600
750 590 001 8.00 5.50 001
800 540 001 8.50 500 002
850 490 001 900 450
900 4.40 0.01 950 400 020
9.50 3.90 004 1000 350 030
1000 3.32 0.08 1050 300
10.50 2.85 0 30 11 00 2.65 035
11.00 240 049 1150 220 045
1150 200 054 1200 1.90 055
12.00 160 0.65 1250 1.75 075
12.50 120 0.75 1300 1.60 110
1300 085 o.ao i3.50 145 160
1400 125
Mar84 700 750 001 July84 700 . 001
14.48 800 650 010 1495 800 695 003
900 550 015 900 595 010
1000 4.50 021 1000 495 027
11.00 aso 040 11.00 3.95 045
1200 250 0.50 12.00 295 068
1300 195 0.65 1300 2.15 090
1400 I6 5 1.00 14.00 180 110
1500 135 135 1500 145 150
1600 120 200
Vol 5278337 Open nt 52783 calls 1.711 puts 171
Each 01 premium $11 20 e.g 50 $560
hit’ relatioiislii
1
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Farmers who wishto use options as a hedge against
declining cash prices would buy a put option in com-
bination with positions in the forward, futures or cash
markets. Food processors or other businessmen that
sought a hedge against priceincreases in the raw coin-
modities they purchase would buy a call option to
complement their positions inothermarkets. An agent
who has a position only in the option market is a
speculator. Speculators fulfill a desirable marketfunc-
tion by assuming risk that other economic agents do
not wish to bear.
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and put options are determined by price expectations
in the option market. Generally, premiums are related
to three factors: the strike price of the individual op-
tion, the length oftimeuntil the option expiresand the
price variability of the underlying futures contract.
To take aspecific example from these data, the pre-
mium on a call option to purchase July 1983 sugar
futures at 10 cents per pound is 3.32 cents per pound;
the total cost of guaranteeing the possibility to pur-
chaseJuly sugar futures at 10 cents perpound is 13.32
cents per pound (10 + 3.32), compared with 13.36
cents per pound futures price. Absent from these cal-
culations are the transaction costs (brokerage fees) of
buying an option or a futures contract.
DETERMINANTS OF OPTION’
PREMIUMS
Option premiums are related directly to an option’s
intrinsic valueandits time value.7Intrinsicvalue is the
difference between an option’s strike price and the
current futures price. For example, if a call option’s
strike price — the amount at which a corn futures
contract could be purchased — were $2.50 perbushel
and the current futures price were $2.70 per bushel,
this option would have an intrinsic value of $0.20 per
bushel. Intuitively, intrinsic value exists ifa profit can
be made by exercisingthe rights oftheoption. If, inthe
example above, the current futures pricewere $2.30, a
call option with a $2.50 per bushel strike price would
he “out ofthe money”: that is, a loss would be incurred
ifthe option rights were exercised. Typically, howev-
7
Option premiums also are influenced by the volatility offutures
prices and interest i’atcs. As futures prices become snore volatile,
the uncertaintyassociated with any one contract’s profitability also
increases. This grcater uncertainty teuds to increase the value of
pricc insurance and, therefore, the value of option premiums
Conversely, high levels ofinterest rates tend to have negative
effects on option values, That is, as the returns ou alternative.
interest—bearing mvestments incrcase, the opportunity cost of
holding au option position increases, This competition among
alternative investments will tend to decrease option premiums.
For a technical discussion of how option premiums are deter-
mined, see Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, “The Valuation of
Option Contracts and a Test of Market Efficiency,” Journal of
Finance (May 1972), pp. 399-418; Blackand Scholes, “The Pricing
ofOptions and CorporateLiabilities, “Jonmat ofPolitical Economy
(May—June 1973), pp. 637—54; Robert C. Merton, “The Theory of
Rational Option Pricing,” Be//JournalofEconomics and Manage-
inent Science (Spring 1973), pp. 141—83; Clifford NV. Smith, “Op-
tion Pricing: A Review,”JonnialofFinancial Economics (Januan’/
March 1976~,pp. 3—51: JamesMacBeth and Larry’ 1~.Melville, “An
Empirical Examination of the Black-Scholes Call Option Pricing
,Model,”Journal of Finance (December 1979), pp. 1173—86; and
Thomas J. O’Brien and William F. Kennedy, “Simultaneous op-
tion and Stock Prices:Another Look atThe Black-Scholes Model,”
The Financial Review (November 1982), pp. 219—27.
er, an option’s premium will exceed the implied
amount of its intrinsic value,
One reason premiums will exceedintrinsicvalue is a
second source of value in an option contract: time
value. Because thefuture is uncertain, there is always
the possibility that unexpected events willsignificantly
affect prices. And, because thispossibility exists, some
market participants will be willing to buy or sell an
option on the chance that one such event will occur.
This explains, forexample, why an “out ofthe money”
option still will be traded ata positive premium; that is,
some buyers are willing to take the chance that some
event will changefutures prices enough to make this a
profitable option. Similarly, premiums maybe greater
than intrinsic value because buyers are willing to pay
for the chance thatfurther changes in the futures price
may make a profitable option even more profitable
before it expires.
An option’s expiration date isthe key factor indeter-
mining its time value. As the length of time until
expiration decreases, there is less time for the futures
price— and, therefore, the option’s profitability — to
change markedly. Conversely, an option of longdura-
tion has more time valtie, ceteris paribtis, because the
probability ofan unexpected event changing its prof-
itability is greater.
The concepts of intrinsic value and time value are
illustrated by the data shown in table 1. For example,
the call option on March 1984 futures with a 14 cents
per pound strike price has an intrinsic value of 0.48
cents per pound (14.48 — 14,00 = 0.48), which is
lower than its premium of 1.65 cents per pound. The
1.17 cent difference between the premium and intrin-
sic value reflects this option’s time value and other
factors that tend to increase premiums. Other things
being equal, this 1.17cent difference should decline as
the length oftime until March decreases and the time
value of the option diminishes.
Time value also is shown in the premiums associated
with options that apply to futures contracts dated for
later delivery. Compare, for example, the four call
options with 11 cents per pound strike prices that
apply to each ofthe four listedfutures. In this instance
— and in others — premiums for options on July 1984
sugar futures are the highest premiums for any of the
listedcontracts. This occurs becausethe greaterlength
oftime until the option expires increases the probabil-
ity that some unanticipated event will cause significant
changes in futures prices. And, with greater price un-
certainty, agents in this market will be willing to pay
more for price insurance.
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Relationship Between Premiums on Put and Call Options
Premium
PC
MARKETING STRATEGIES AND THE
A Str&e price ROLE OF OPTIONS
These relationships are illustrated further in figure
1. Strike prices are plotted on the horizontal axis and
option premiums are plotted on the vertical axis. The
two interior lines labelled “Puts” and “Calls” plot the
relationships between strike prices and premiums for
the two different kinds of options. In one sense, this
figure is a stylized plotofthe strikepriceand premium
data contained in table 1.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, strike prices
and premiums for put options should be related posi-
tively. That is, the rightto sell a product ata low price
should have a relatively low value. Conversely, as the
strike priceatwhich the product canbe sold rises, the
rightto execute this sale also should increasein value.
These relationships are the basis for giving the “Put”
line a positive slope.
The strike price-premium tradeofffor call options is
just opposite thatofputs and,consequently, itsline has
a negative slope. Intuitively, this is supported by the
notion that the right to buy a product at a low price
should have a higher value than the right to buy at a
high price. Therefore, as a call option’s strike price
declines, its premium should increase.
The intersection of the “Put” and “Call” lines also
suggests a relationship not revealed in the discon-
tinuous data oftable 1. Specifically, when an option’s
strike price is equal to the current futures price, the
premium on a put should equal the premium on acall.
The reasoning is that, ifthe futures price represents
the market’s best guess about actual prices at a later
date, the value ofthe right to buy at that price (a call)
should be equal to the value of the right to sell at that
price (a put). Or, from a different view, options with
strike prices above or below the current futures price
carry an implicit bet that the current futures price is
“wrong.” So, for example, a call option with a strike
priceat point A would have arelatively low premium,
because itwould givethe right to buy aproduct in the
future at a pricehigher than the market’s current best
guess of that future price. Conversely, a put option
withthat samestrike price would have arelatively high
premium to reflect the bet that the current futures
Calls price underestimates the level of cash prices at the
later date.
The mechanics and terminology of options trading
maybedefinedfurther bywayofan example. Consider
the case of a farmer who, at time of spring planting,
expects to produce 5,000 bushels of corn, an amount
that coincides withthe size ofone futures contract. He
also thinks that his total cost ofproducing each bushel
ofcorn willbe $2.50. Finally, he knows that thefutures
contract dated for December delivery — after hishar-
vest time—values corn at $2.80per bushel. Assuming
a constant 10-cents-per-bushel basis, he can expect
local cash prices at the time ofharvest to be $2.70 per
bushel.8
These prices andthe effectivesupport prices ofgov-
ernment crop programs represent the core ofinforma-
tion on which his marketing decisions must be made.
Still unknown, however, are the quality ofthe growing
seasonweather and the effects itand otherfactors may
have on his yield per acre. Or, rather, because he still
is unsure ofhisyieldsand those ofotherproducers, itis
unclearwhether cashprices at harvest willbe higher or
lower than $2.70.
8
Basis istheper unit differencein thefutures priceand thelocal spot
(cash) price for a commodity. Jn this example, the current (May)
price of a December futures is $2.80; the current spot price is
$2.70. Therefore, the basis is $0.10. The returns toaperson with a
position inthe futures market isthe change in thebasis that occurs.
That is, ifDecember futures increase to $3.00, the basis becomes
$0.30 ($3.00 ‘— $2.70) which produces a $0.20 ($0.30 — $0.10)
change in the basis. This 20-cent change will be a gain or loss
depending upon whether a person held a long orshort position in
futures. Typically, thebasis reflects the spreadbetween localspot
markets and the relevant futures snarket. Costs offinancing, stor-
age and insurance also are part ofthe basis. Also, contrary to the
simpli~’ing assumption ofthis example, the basis will not be con-
stant during the crop year.
Current
futures price
Pp = p,emivm 0, p~~l op5oe ~,itl, strike p,ice— A.
coil option “ill, sn,ike p,ic,— A.
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Table 2
Results of Alternative Marketing Strategies
Under a Price Increase
Assumptions: On May 1, prior to planting. a corn producer anticipates a 5,000 bushel harvest
with costs of $2 50 per bushel Also in May. the December futures contract
prices corn at $2.80 per bushel In November, the realized cash price is $310
per bushel and the December futures price is $3.20.
STRATEGY
Income $ 15.500 $ 15,500 $ 15.500
Cost -12.500 12,500 12,500





Option Premium .... 750
PROFIT $ 3.000 $ 1,000 $ 2.250
Dependingon his own attitude toward risk, an mdi- futures market might face a cash price of something
vidual producer may choose several marketing like$2.O0attimeofharvestifthenationalcropislarger
strategies. On one extreme, he may go totally un- than previously expected; this would produce a loss of
hedged — that is, he may just harvest his crop and $0.50 per bushel. Conversely, aproducer who hedged
accept whatevercashprice prevails atthat time. At the all 5,000 bushels at $2.80 has no alternative but to
other extreme, a very risk-averseproducer may hedge accept that price at harvest. While this form of price
his entire crop by sellingone corn futurescontract. By insurance guarantees $2.80 per bushel, it also pre-
hedging, the producer canguarantee thatthe price he cludes thechance tosell forthe higher cashprices that
receives for his corn will be $2.80 per bushel, the could prevail if the national crop were smaller than
current price of December corn futures. Between expected. Insteadofthese marketing positions, a more
these extremes is a strategy in which a portion ofthe flexible approach would have two characteristics: it
cropis hedgedinthefutures market andthe remainder would provide insurance against a decline in cash
is sold at the prevailing cash price.
These strategies, however, also indicate that there is
a gapin alternatives that would he filled by a market in
commodity options. That is, a producer who is totally
unhedged has no insurance against downside price
movements. Or, following this example, a producer
who does not hedge at least part of his crop in the
prices, while simultaneouslyallowing gains tobe
if cash prices increased above contract prices.
modity options have these features .~
made
Com-
°Optionshave the advantage that if a farmer’s hedge became un-
covered due to, say, a crop failure, his losses would be limited to
the option premium. Losses from a futures hedge under these
conditions could be much larger if prices increased substantially.
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Continuing withthe earlierexample, it is clearthat a
market in commodity options would expand the scope
ofmarketing strategies forfarmersand agribusiness. In
addition to theearlier marketing strategies — nohedg-
ing versus complete hedging — athird strategy involv-
ingan option is introduced. Under the assumptions in
this example, production costs of$12,500will beincur-
red under any marketing strategy (5,000 bushels x
$2.50 per bushel). Also assumed is a $750 (15 cents-
per-bushel premium) cost for buying a “put” option.
Table2 shows theresults ofthese strategies underan
assumed increasein futuresprices to $3.20per bushel;
assuming a constant 10-cents basis throughout this
example, cash prices at harvest would be $3.10 per
bushel.’°Each strategy is detailed in a separate col-
umn of the table. Each strategy also involves two dis-
tinct steps: first, the choice of a marketing strategy at
time of planting (May) and, second, the execution of
that strategy after harvest (November). These stages
are represented in the upper and lower halves ofthe
table)’
Under assumed increases in futures prices to $3.20
and in cash prices to $3.10 per bushel, strategy No. 1
yields a return of $3,000, the highest of the three
strategies. Because income and production costs are
equal in each strategy, the “no hedge” earns greater
returns because it avoids aloss offutures (strategy No.
2) and the cost of option premiums (strategy No. 3).
Therefore, aproducer choosingstrategyNo. learned a
greaterprofit during this year but didsowithout insur-
ance against price declines. Conversely, producers
choosingto hedgetheircrops orpurchase optionsreal-
ized smaller profits, but were protected against the
possibility of price decreases. The return to strategy
No. 2i slowerby the $2,000 loss on the sale ofDecem-
ber futures [($3.20 — $2.80) x 5,000 bu. = $2,000].
Producers choosing to buy options instead offutures
earned greater profits, but this result is dependent on
the assumed values for alternative options premiums
50
E’ach ofthese examples ignores a number of factors that would
complicatethe analysis.For example, theoutput ofthisindividual
producer does not vary with changesin aggregate production. The
returns also are dependent on assumptions regarding the elastic-
ity of demand. Rather than providing a complete analysis that
considers these complicating considerations, however, the intent
ofthe examples isto illustrate qualitative differences amongthe
various strategies.
“The strategies shown are the most basic approaches to grain
marketing. Much more complicated examples, which combine
the simultaneous use ofdiffering positions in futures and options
markets, can be used to illustrate how varying levels of price
insurance and speculation Canbe achieved. See, forinstance, the
strategies discussed in Strategiesfor Buyingand Writing Options
on Treasury Bond Futures published by the Chicago Board of
Trade. These examples can be adapted with few changes to
strategies for grain marketing.
and changes in futures prices; these results merely
illustrate qualitative differences among marketing
strategies.
Returns under different risk-management strategies
might be illustrated more clearly by re-evaluating the
previous example under adecline in the futures price.
Table 3, which includes balance sheet figures for an
assumed November futures price of $2.40 and cash
price of $2.30 (constant 10-cents-basis assumption),
reports these results. As in the previous example, the
strategy involving options (No. 3) yields a return be-
tween those of the other strategies. Now, however,
after a price decline, the unhedged strategy (No. 1)
yields a loss of $1,000; or, rather, column one shows
what canoccur ifmarket prices decline and a producer
has no protection against such losses. Conversely, col-
umn two — under a strategy of complete hedging —
shows the benefits of locking in a known price at the
time of planting. Finally, the strategy that includes
options shows a profit, butone less than that for selling
futures; the difference is the amount of the option
premium. But, although the premium costs are $750,
the purchase of the corn futures yields a return of
$2,000.
Finally, table 4 illustrates the relative returns to the
three strategies if prices do not show a net change
during the year. As the entries in the table indicate,
each strategywould result in a sale of corn in the cash
market at $2.70 per bushel. Once again ignoring the
transaction costs of futures or options contracts,
strategies No. 1 and No, 2 would yield a profit of
$1,000, whereas the cost ofthe option premium would
reduce returns to strategy No. 3 to $250.
In view of these differing returns to different
strategies as assumptions vary concerning end-of-
season prices, an important consideration is the ex-
pected (cx ante) return to each marketing strategy.
That is, in May, what can an individual producer ex-
pect to earn from crop marketings in November?
A comparison of these expected values is shown in
table 5.
As the table indicates — for this set of alternative
outcomes and probabilities — strategies No. 1 andNo.
2 yield equal expected returns, while the strategy us-
ing options produces a lower expected return. This is
not unlikely, however, in view of the speculative ser-
vices that options offer in addition to their basic price
insurance.’2 Or, rather, because options offer a chance
52
For example, see Telser, “Why There Are Organized Futures
Markets,” for adiscussion and references concerning why agents
may choose to engage in speculative strategies in which expected
returns are negative.
11Table 3
Results of Alternative Marketing Strategies
Under a Price Decrease
STRATEGY
#2: Sell #3: Buy
IN MAV: #1. No hedge Futures Contract ‘Put’ Option







Sell corn in cash for $2 80:
Sell corn in cash market at$2.30 sell harvested
market at $2.30 and buy December corn for $2.30
IN NOVEMBER: cash price futures at!.t~_ cash price
Income $ 11.500 $ 11.500 $ 11.5001
Cost 12.500 ‘12500 12.500
Futures Premium 2.000 2.000
Option Premium . 75~
PROFIT ‘á~ 1.000 $ 1.000 $ 250
‘Total income of $1 3.500 is derived from sales ot harvested corn (5,000 bu. - $2.30 = $11 .500~ and
protit of $2,000 on the change in futures prices [($280 $2.40) ‘ 5,000 bu. ‘ $2000].
Table 4
Results of Alternative Marketing Strategies
Under Constant Prices
Same strategy as in tabie 2
Let option
oxpire and sell
Sell corn at $2 70 Se;l corn in cash corn n cash
IN NOVEMBER: cash price market at S270 market at $2.70
Income $ 13.500 $ 13,500 $ 13,500
Cost 12.500 ‘12500 12,500
Futures Gain (Loss) .. ...
Option Premium .... 750
PROFIT $ 1.000 $ 1.000 $ 250FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1983
Table 5




#1 No hedge fl Selling Futures Put Option
$ 3.000 $ 1.000 $2 250
1.000 1 000 250
1.000 — 2.900 250
1 otal
Returns S 3000 $ 3000 S 27b0
Expected returns TOTAL RETURNS 033)’
*1 #3
E(R) “ 1.000 1.000 917
‘For purposes of this exanlp;e. it is assumea that the real worla





Returns Under Alternative Marketing Strategies
Returns
for additional profits ifprices rise to alevel greaterthan
the sum ofthe market priceplus the option premium,
it is expected that this additional speculative feature
can be gained only at some additional cost.
These relationships might be seen more clearly in a
graphic comparison of returns produced by the three
marketing strategies discussed earlier. Figure 2 plots
returns for unhedged (1), straight-hedge (2) and op-
tions (3) strategies.’3 The dashed line shows the re-
turns toan unhedged strategyin which all grain is sold
in the cash market at the prevailing price; as might be
expected, it is a 45-degree line from the origin. Re-
turns toa straight hedge, involving the sale ofa futures
contract, are shown by the horizontal line drawn at a
level denoted by R11. This line shows that the producer
can guarantee a return of R11 per bushel but cannot
gain from price increases above that level.
The kinked line shows the returns to a strategy
involving options and, by inference, the role options
play in hedging — speculative strategies. In fact, the
shape ofthis returns line illustratestheunique features
of a put option. The horizontal segment of the line,
drawn at a level equal to $2, shows the maximum
return that can be achieved iffutures prices are below
the option’s exercise price. Or, rather, because the
5~
l’hisfigure is adapted from a similar diagram in Gardner, “Coin-
modity Options for Agriculture.”
figure indicates that the option premium is $0.50, the
$2 level ofthenet returns line implies thatthe option’s
strike price is $2.50 (strike price — premium = net
return). This horizontal line segment also is the mini-
mum return the owner ofthisput optionwill earn. The
horizontal portion of the option’s return line, then,
represents the insurance characteristics ofan option.
The returns line also hasan upward-sloping segment
that begins at the break-even price of$2.50; this seg-
ment illustrates the speculative characteristics of op-
tions. That is, forfuturesprices above $2.50, the option
can be allowed to expire, and the grain can be sold in
the cashmarket at higherprices. Notice, however, that
this portion ofthe option’s return line falls below the
“returns to cash sales” line by an amount equal to the
option premium. Conversely, at allprices above $3.00,
the option yields a higher return than a straight hedge
in the futures market.
Finally, it should benoted that figure 2 impliesthat a
strategy involving options performs most poorly if
prices remain within a $2.00—$3.00 band; both futures
and cash market sales will produce a higher net return
for prices in this range. And, because the current
futures price in this example is $2.50, this result high-
lights again the unique feature ofan option: it carries
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mates the eventual levelofcashprices by a substantial
margin. In fact, as this example iswritten, thepurchas-
er ofacall option on this futures contractwould believe
the futures price willincrease by at least20percent (50
cents) to offset the option’s 50-cent premium.
The general result implied by theseexamples is that
commodity options provide insurance against price
declines without totally eliminating the potential
profits fromprice increases. Although totalreturns toa
strategy involving options tend to be lower than re-
turns tootherstrategies (forexample, strategy No. 1 in
table 2 and strategy No. 2 in table 3) because the
additional costs ofoption premiums are incurred, op-
tions never produce a loss (in theseexamples) andyield
substantially higher returns than futures if prices in-
crease. Therefore, somewhat lower average returns
provided by a strategy involving options might be
viewed as the price paid for additional speculative
services not available in futures markets.
OPTIONS MARKETS VS. PRICE
SUPPORTS
A market in commodity options would offer grain
producers many ofthe hedgingopportunities current-
ly availablein legislated price support programs.’4 For
example, a put option’s strike price would function in
muchthe same manner as program loan rates, And, as
with an option position, a producer is not required to
complywith program provisions butmay electtoexer-
cise program privileges at his discretion. At a general
level, options and price support programs function in
similar fashion. And, in one sense, a function of the
CF’TC pilot program may be to discover whether op-
tions markets can co-exist withpricesupport programs
as they now stand.
There are at least two important differences, howev-
er, between options and current price support pro-
grams. First, unlike one specified loan rate that applies
foran entire crop year, an option purchaser mayselect
from a variety of contracts with different strike prices
and premiums. Second, trading in options contracts
will nothavethe largeand direct effects on agricultural
production and resource allocation that have been
attributed to price supports. The particulars of each
distinction are discussed below.
Ifagrain producer is eligible to participatein a price
support program, one of his key decision variables is
t
4
For a discussion of these programs, see Michael T. Belongia,
“Outlook for Agriculture in 1983,” this Review (February 1983),
pp. 14—24; or Bruce L. Gardner, The Governing ofAgriculture,
(The Regents Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1981).
the program’s loan rate. Ifmarket prices fall below the
loan rate, which is a legislatively determined priceper
bushel of grain, the producer can place his grain in
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks and re-
ceive a loan in exchange; the loan value is determined
by multiplying the number of bushels placed in CCC
stocks by the loan rate. If, after nine months, market
priceshave notrisen abovethe loan rate, the producer
may elect to forfeit his grain to the CCC and keep the
loan. In this way, the loan rate serves as an effective
price floor for eligible producers. Also notice that,
although these producers are hedged against price
declines, they are free to sell their grain at market
prices if such prices rise above the loan rate.
This protection against large price declines, while
maintaining the possibility of profits, also is a distin-
guishing feature of a commodity option. Options,
however, differ from government price supports by
offering a range of strike prices (essentially, different
loan rates) from which a producercan choose. In other
words, options allow producers to select the level of
prices at which they wishto be hedged against further
price declines.
This pointcanbe clarified by an example. Consider,
for instance, the 1983 corn program and its loan rate of
$2.65 perbushel. While it provides this price floor for
producers, price insuranceagainst declines below, say
$2.90, is available only by selling a futures contract at
that price. Recall, however, that one disadvantage of
this strategy is the rigidity of obligations implied by a
futures contract.
In contrast to these less flexible strategies, a viable
options market would allow producers to select the
level ofprice insurance they desire. For example, as a
parallel to the data in table 1, an optionon corn futures
might list strike prices ranging from $2.30 to $3.20 per
bushel; eachoption also would have its own premium.
Therefore, a producer who wanted protection against
price declines below $3.20 couldbuy aput option with
that strike price. Similarly, if$2.30 were an acceptable
price floor, that put option could be purchased. The
unique feature ofoptions, however, is that individuals
are free to select the amount ofprice insurance they
desire and pay a competitively determined premium
for it.
The other main distinction between options and
price supports is that options are not likely to have
largedirect effects on the quantityofgrainproduced.’5
Economic theory suggests that effective support pro-
t5
See Gardner, “Commodity Options for Agriculture.
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grams will increase production by increasing produc-
ers’ expected prices and decreasing the variance of
their ~ Under theseconditions, producers can
expect to receive greater returns at less risk. If pro-
gram incentives to increase production are not offset
by output reductions effected by program acreage
limitations, price supports will allocate too many re-
sources to the production of the protected commod-
ities. These distortions in resource allocation could be
avoided if they were replaced by options trading.
But evenifdirect effects on output wereminimized,
options will not avoid all resource allocation effects
associated with government price support programs.
For instance, this approach to risk management may
induce someproducers to shiftfrom the use offertilizer
and pesticides to the purchase of options. Similarly,
agents who write options will likely shift some re-
sources from other investments to the purchase of
futures or physical commodities in an effort to offset
their options positions. Therefore, to the extent op-
tions become an attractive asset to marketing
strategies, this new market will have some effects on
resource allocations.
What options would avoid are the wealth transfers
and capitalization effects associated with the “free”
price insurance of government programs.’7 That is,
current government programs transfer wealth from
taxpayers who payfor the priceinsurance to producers
‘
6
See, for example, Michael T. Belongia, “Agricultural Price Sup-
ports and Cost of Production: Comment,” Ame,tan Journal of
Agricultural Economics (August 1983), forthcoming.
‘
7
Producers do pay — indirectly — ifthey are required to reduce
output to participate in the price support programs.
who receive the benefits ofits protection. Wealth also
is transferred from land buyers to land owners via the
capitalization ofprogram benefits into the value ofland
eligible for those benefits. This capitalization also
raiseslandprices abovethelevel they would havebeen
in the absence ofgovernment programs. This induced
change in land prices then affects the mix ofresources
used to produce products in which land is an input.
Other secondary effects on resource allocation also
could be avoided if government programs were re-
placed by options markets.
CONCLUSIONS
Thetrading ofoptionson agricultural commodities is
likely to begin sometimein 1984under apilot program
supervised by the CFTC. Options fill a gap between
futures markets and theprice insurance ofgovernment
programs by offering market participants the oppor-
tunity to select the amount of price insurance they
desire while, simultaneously, not precluding the
opportunity for profits if prices change appreciably.
Although options will never provide the highest
level ofincome that could have been earned under an
assumption of perfect foresight, marketing strategies
that include options establish a minimum price for
producers without eliminating the opportunity for
gains if market prices increase. Finally, although op-
tions and price support programs are alike in many
respects, options would provide greater flexibility in
choosing a level of price insurance. Further, they are
less likely to increase agricultural production or pro-
duce the distortions in resource allocation associated
with price support programs.
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